Urban Inequality and Political Recruitment Networks by Strömblad, Per & Myrberg, Gunnar
 
 
Strömblad, Per & Gunnar Myrberg 






Arbetsrapport/Institutet för Framtidsstudier; 2008:3 
ISSN: 1652-120X 
ISBN: 978-91-85619-21-4 
 Urban Inequality and Political Recruitment Networks 
 





This paper provides evidence of segregation-generated differences in political 
recruitment networks. By taking explicit account of social-geographical differentiation 
in the urban landscape, we evaluate—in prior work largely neglected—contextual 
effects on requests for participation.  Consistent with previous research, we find that 
those activists who try to convince others to participate in political life systematically 
use a set of selection criteria when deciding whom to approach. However, using recent 
data based on a sample of inhabitants of Swedish cities and properties of their 
neighborhoods, we also show that the degree of (aggregate-level) social exclusion 
negatively influences (individual-level) recruitment efforts. This contextual effect stems 
both from the disproportional population composition as such in residential areas, and 
from recruiters’ rational avoidance of areas marked by high levels of social exclusion. 
We conclude that these logics jointly reinforce urban inequalities regarding the chances 
for ordinary citizens to be invited to political life. 
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I denna uppsats studerar vi uppmaningar till vanliga medborgare att engagera sig i 
politiska aktiviteter. Det kan gälla förfrågningar om att gå med i demonstrationer, skriva 
på upprop, eller delta i konsumentbojkotter, men det kan också gälla ansträngningar 
som företrädare för politiska partier gör i syfte att värva nya medlemmar. Tidigare 
forskning har visat att sådana vardagliga försök till ”politisk rekrytering” inte sker 
slumpmässigt. I likhet med vad som gäller för skillnader i politisk aktivitetsgrad i stort 
påverkas utfallet av samhällets statusskillnader. De som i olika avseenden är bättre 
bemedlade och mer resursstarka tycks oftare få förfrågningar om att delta i det politiska 
livet. Eftersom personer i dessa grupper redan tenderar att vara mer politiskt aktiva än 
den genomsnittlige medborgaren ökar därigenom också skillnaderna i demokratisk 
delaktighet. 
 
Tidigare undersökningar om politisk rekrytering har i huvudsak varit baserade på data 
från USA. Vår studie visar emellertid att likartade mönster för vem som blir tillfrågad 
också finns i Sverige. Därtill bidrar vi med ett nytt perspektiv genom att uppmärksamma 
boendesegregationens betydelse i detta sammanhang. Vi visar att fördelningen av 
riktade uppmaningar om att engagera sig politiskt inte endast avgörs av egenskaper på 
individnivå (såsom kön, nationellt ursprung och utbildningsnivå), utan också av 
resursnivån i det område man bor. 
 
Enligt våra resultat påverkar socioekonomiska skillnader mellan olika stadsdelar 
chanserna att få förfrågningar om att delta i politiska aktiviteter. I bostadsområden 
präglade av arbetslöshet och bidragsberoende är chansen att bli politiskt rekryterad 
väsentligt lägre än i andra områden, oberoende av vilka egenskaper en given individ i 
övrigt har. Vår slutsats är att den urbana ojämlikhet som segregationen representerar 
påverkar sammansättningen av de nätverk inom vilka politisk rekrytering sker, något 
som i förlängningen också försämrar förutsättningarna för politisk jämlikhet.  
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Ordinary citizens are sometimes personally invited to take part in political life—
someone asks them to join a political party, to participate in a protest-march, or to sign a 
petition. Previous research tells us that such endeavors are frequently worthwhile; that 
is, those being asked often respond positively by word and deed (Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995:ch. 5; cf. Grant and Rudolph 2002; Abramson and Clagget 2001; Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1992). However, it has also been shown that these political recruitment 
efforts are selective to their character; they tend to be biased in favor of socio-
economically privileged groups of citizens (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: ch. 5, 
13; Brady, Schlozman and Verba 1999:157–158). Hence, examining systematic patterns 
in this respect should render a more complete picture of the causes of participatory 
stratification in democratic societies (Brady, Schlozman and Verba 1999; cf. Oliver 
2000; Leighley 1995).  
 
Contributing to this particular field of political sociology, this paper evaluates 
contextual effects on requests for participation. We argue that analyses of political 
recruitment efforts are inconclusive if they fail to consider the importance of aggregate 
level socio-economic and demographic differentiation. Specifically, we focus on urban 
inequalities, thus investigating how individual access to recruitment networks are 
affected by intra-city discrepancies between more and less privileged residential areas. 
Micro-macro relationships of this kind are seldom explicitly modeled in previous 
research on political recruitment, although the theoretical links accounting for 
individual-level variations are readily convertible to the contextual level. And consistent 
with the theoretical augmentation we propose, our empirical findings reveal that the 
odds of being approached by mobilizing activists rise and fall systematically, as one 
travels across city districts.  
1. Political recruitment and the perspective of recruiters 
Encouragement makes a difference in many areas of life. People may decide to take 
action in a certain direction as a result from a ‘push’ given by a friend, a neighbor, a 
fellow-worker or even by a (reasonably trustworthy) stranger. Including a political push 
factor in their Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM), Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) 
were able to demonstrate that personal requests for participation can be consequential 
too: ‘Those who are asked…might have intended to act anyway, but the request was the 
triggering factor.’ (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995:273).  
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Accordingly, citizens who are encouraged by someone else to take part in political 
activities tend to show higher participation rates.1 Political recruitment thus seems to be 
an important aspect of every-day political life and an independent cause of political 
participation.2 Moreover, Brady, Schlozman and Verba’s (1999:157–158) analyses 
suggest that political recruitment efforts are socio-economically biased. Closely 
resembling well-known relationships between socio-economic status and political 
participation, the better educated and well heeled tend to receive more requests than 
citizens at the lower end of the socio-economic status scale.  
 
In causal modeling terms, a skeptic would perhaps argue that the distance is short 
between (the independent variable) recruitment and (the dependent variable) political 
participation of the CVM. Few become surprised, when taught that persons who are 
regularly invited to take part in political life also prove to be more active members of 
society. At any rate, it seems hard to imagine that personal requests for participation 
would constantly be turned down.3
  
Nevertheless, the seemingly tautological character of the relationship between political 
recruitment and participation has in fact proved to be of great significance in applied 
research. This is because a wide array of social circumstances potentially translates into 
                                                 
1 Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s work represents a valuable attempt to encapsulate the direct 
causes of political participation (explicating, that is, the indirect relationships between 
background factors such as level of education or ethnicity, and involvement in political life). In 
addition to ‘access to recruitment networks’, Verba, Schlozman and Brady discern ‘resources’ 
(such as civic skills and free time) and ‘engagement’ (indicated by political interest and 
efficacy) as the decisive explanatory factors of political participation (1995: ch. 9–12). 
Scholarly contributions demonstrating the empirical fruitfulness of the CVM include McClurg 
2003; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Oliver 2000. 
2 The effect of political recruitment efforts is independent as the positive relationship holds even 
if variations in resources and engagement are accounted for (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995:388–390). It should be noted, however, that the internal (‘within-model’) causal relation 
between this factor on the one hand, and resources and engagement on the other, remains 
largely unspecified in the original version of the theory (Strömblad 2003:44–45, n. 12; cf. 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995:609–611; see also Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). 
3 In fact, personal requests for participation are (as demonstrated by Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995:135, and as we will show below) more often than not successful. That is, when 
personally invited to participate politically, people often say ‘yes’.  
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different individual participation levels by means of the recruitment mechanism.4 That 
is, analyzing access to recruitment networks will increase our chances to explain why 
certain categories of citizens are much more likely to make use of their democratic 
rights than others. In addition to Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s own contributions in 
this particular respect (1995:ch. 14), empirical evaluations have, for instance, concerned 
the effect on participation of city population size (Oliver 2000), of having status as an 
immigrant in Sweden (Adman and Strömblad 2000), and of engagement in voluntary 
associations (Teorell 2003). In all studies mentioned, access to recruitment networks 
explained a substantial part of the observed relationships between the particular 
experience in focus and political participation.5
 
While bearing in mind the consequences of political recruitment demonstrated in earlier 
work, our goal in this paper is not to explain differences in participation levels. Rather, 
we concentrate our efforts to the opposite side of the causal chain. Focusing putative 
causes of recruitment efforts, we argue that a spatial dimension should complement 
previously analyzed individual-level sources of recruitment bias (Brady, Schlozman and 
Verba 1999). In other words, we expect requests for political participation to vary 
systematically not only across social groups, but also across social environments. 
 
Such an hypothesis turns out to be reasonable, when we picture the situation of the 
actual stars of the scene—those who are responsible for the requests. We assume, as do 
Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1999), that political recruiters prefer to be successful (or, 
do not wish to see their requests turned down) and therefore strive to approach fellow 
citizens that could be regarded as potential participants; that is, people who probably say 
‘yes’, when asked to participate in a political activity. In short, rational recruiters 
‘search for likely targets’ (Brady, Schlozman and Verba 1999:153).  
 
                                                 
4 A similar argument could be made for the resource and engagement factors of Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady’s model (Strömblad 2003:42–47).  
5 These studies differ, however, with respect to the operationalization of the recruitment 
variable. Along with Adman and Strömblad (2000), Teorell (2003) uses the annual frequency of 
requests for participation, whereas Oliver (2000) dichotomizes the variable, thus defining a 
person as being exposed to recruitment networks if she or he had been asked to participate at 
least once in the past year (otherwise not). For reasons explained below, we adhere to the latter 
strategy in our own study.  
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The obvious question is then where they should search. Clearly, locating promising 
candidates demands accurate information. For instance, knowing that a certain person is 
an active member of a political party would probably indicate that a request is 
worthwhile. However, knowledge of this kind is typically limited to the narrow social 
network. Recruiters, like people in general, presumably possess far more information 
about people they know personally than about strangers. Most of us probably have a 
fairly good picture of our friends’ and close relatives’ political interest and engagement. 
Although to a somewhat lesser extent, the same should be true when it comes to fellow 
workers, fellow members of voluntary associations and other personal acquaintances. 
Thus, selecting likely targets for recruitment efforts within one’s own primary, and 
perhaps also secondary, social network should not be too hard. However, if a recruiter 
wants to make requests outside her own networks (perhaps simply to increase the 
overall amount of desired political activity as much as possible) the task immediately 
becomes more challenging. Facing the usual constraints of limited time and energy, the 
recruiter has to decide which strangers to approach.  
 
Whenever information is scarce, Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1999:156–158) argue 
that a wise recruiter—by intuition if not by actual insights in political science—is 
guided by indicators of socio-economic status. If recruiters (rightly) assume that 
education, income and labor-market position are related to political interest and 
involvement these characteristics may function as ‘proxy-variables’, hence providing 
directions for rational recruitment efforts. That is, being unaware of a certain person’s 
political participation record, a recruiter could nevertheless choose to approach her or 
him, if observable characteristics appear auspicious. According to this line of thought, 
the person whose way of life (as far as it is observable) convey prosperity and socially 
privileged circumstances is assumed to receive more requests for participation than the, 
seemingly, less fortunate one. 
 
Consistent with these expectations, Brady, Schlozman and Verba find that recruitment 
bias stems from requests that are directed towards strangers (1999:158–159). The 
‘visible’ characteristics of socioeconomic status (along with involvement in religious 
and voluntary organizations) turned out to be consequential only for recruitment efforts 
in which the person asking and the person being asked did not know each other. As for 
the separately analyzed occurrences in which recruiters and targets did know each other, 
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less visible characteristics, such as civic skills and political engagement, instead turned 
out to be significant predictors of recruitment efforts (Brady, Schlozman and Verba 
1999:158–159).  
 
Although Brady, Schlozman and Verba’s findings make perfect sense, we contend that 
their explanatory model needs one more element. This is because it is reasonable to 
assume that recruitment patterns in a segregated society are rooted not only in 
individual characteristics, but also in contextual properties. Furthermore, paying 
attention also to the contextual level, recruitment bias may no longer be an outcome 
solely attributable to requests directed towards strangers. 
2. Recruitment in segregated cities 
To explore influences of urban segregation on political recruitment, we draw on insights 
from the contextual analysis tradition of political science. Dating back at least to 
Herbert Tingsten’s pioneering election studies in the early 1930’s (Tingsten 1937), 
scholars have found good reasons to consider the importance of contextual factors—as 
for instance the population composition of neighborhoods—when explaining variations 
in political attitudes and behavior (for overviews, see Books and Prysby 1991:ch. 1–2; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993; Oliver 1999). Accordingly, results from numerous studies 
suggest that socially determined differences in individuals’ close environments are 
consequential. Thus, in forming attitudes and preferences, but also in acquiring 
resources, conditions for individuals may differ from place to place, depending for 
instance on which categories of people they encounter (and perhaps socialize with) on 
an every-day basis.  
 
The mechanisms of such contextual influences are frequently supposed to be rooted in 
social contacts. Put simply, people tend to influence each other. In the present study, 
however, the hypothetical relationships turn out to be somewhat more complex. The 
influences are in this case probably best understood as a transmission of beliefs about 
different residential areas across the entire city. It seems safe to assume that most 
inhabitants of a city have a fairly good picture of the socio-economic and demographic 
variations of their own urban setting. Being informed, by housing market prices, media 
reports, and word of mouth, it is not too hard to develop a reasonably well-substantiated 
idea about differences in population composition between the city-districts. This should 
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in turn have consequences for recruiters’ preference ordering of areas in which they 
may search for targets.  
 
Apart from such an externally driven ‘selection-effect’, however, one may also expect 
that an internally driven ‘compositional effect’ at least to some extent explains urban 
inequalities in political recruitment efforts. It should be safe to assume that recruiters—
being political activists themselves—are not uniformly represented in all 
neighborhoods. On the contrary, due to area-based differences in aggregate 
socioeconomic status one would presume that some places are rich while others are 
poor, also in terms of the representation of people who habitually invite others to 
political life. 
 
In the urban landscape, ‘social topology’ thus affects the chances of being encountered 
by political recruiters for two different reasons. Yet one should bear in mind that these 
reasons have a common source: the segregation-generated inequalities in residential 
area population-structure.   
  
Now, what is the implication of this contemplation in view of Brady, Schlozman and 
Verba’s conclusion regarding the foundation of recruitment bias? As it turns out, we can 
no longer be sure that this bias rests exclusively with the recruiters’ approaches to 
strangers. 
 
To fix ideas, consider first the situation of a recruiter who wants to maximize chances of 
finding likely participants outside her or his own social network. Quite naturally, the 
first step of this enterprise would be to choose a location, in which the search may 
begin.6 Note that such a scenario by no means forecloses the possibility of the selection 
process described by Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1999:154–155). Instead, the process 
is simply modeled as having two stages—or, perhaps more precisely, two filters. In the 
first, the recruiter has to select an area, or domain, where potential candidates are likely 
                                                 
6 To be sure, requests for political action are sometimes made by telephone or through mail, 
whereby the recruiter does not have to leave home. Unfortunately, we do not have data in this 
study on differences in the technical form of contact. Examining possible variations in this 
respect is thus beyond our scope. Still, assuming that few requests are made by utilizing 
random-digit dialing or the like, the proposition should hold, in that a target area is probably 
chosen for which phone numbers and/or addresses are collected.   
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to be found. Once there, the recruiter may in the second stage proceed in seeking out the 
actual individuals—that is, people with an ostensibly high participatory potential.  
 
Let us then focus on the contrasting logic of approaching friends and acquaintances. In 
such cases, the recruiter does not need to discern a certain residential area as the 
‘primary sampling unit’. The targets in this procedure are simply chosen on the basis of 
(known) individual characteristics, wherever they may reside. In this case, however, 
costs would probably be minimized if the recruiter opt for people living nearby. Thus, 
the rational strategy appears to be that requests of this kind are made within the 
recruiter’s own neighborhood.7
 
To further distill the model, and possible outcomes, suppose that a city consists only of 
a high-status residential area A, and a low-status residential area B. We have reasons to 
believe that the number of recruiters living in A (denoted  ) in relation to the total 
number of inhabitants in A (denoted  ) exceeds the corresponding fraction in B. 
Recruitment efforts (denoted 
A R
A N
RE) may, as previously described, be carried out among 
people who know each other, as well as between strangers. Assuming equal proportions 
of social contacts in general (that is, disregarding contacts involving recruitment efforts) 
in the respective areas, we may hypothesize that inhabitants of A tend to receive more 
requests to participate politically from people they know than inhabitants of B. Formally 
we may specify that: 
 
  B B A A B A N R N R if RE RE > >   
 
In fact, this set of inequalities also holds for the case of recruitment efforts carried out 
between subjects and objects that do not know each other. This follows from the 
assumption that recruiters in A, when deciding which strangers to approach, would 
preferably choose to sample targets from their own neighborhood (recall that only two 
areas are supposed to exist). On the contrary, facing the similar situation recruiters in 
                                                 
7 Obviously, the recruiter’s place of work represents an alternative setting. This possibility is, 
however, left outside the highly stylized model we propose here. Yet, it should be mentioned 
that the presence of recruitment ‘on the job’ is unlikely to confound any systematic effects of 
residential area characteristics. In this study, they will rather end up as a random variation in the 
dependent variable, that we are unable to explain with the chosen explanatory factors.   
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area B would rather take a trip to A, where the chances of finding potential participants 
are assumed to be higher.   
 
In more general terms, the intra-city selection process we describe, may be formalized 
in a basic probability model: 
 
) , ( ) ( i j ij I C f RE p =  
 
Assuming a probabilistic selection process, the chances for individual i in context j to be 
subject to a recruitment effort, denoted  , depends upon both contextual factors, 
summarized by the vector 
) ( ij RE p
C j, and individual level factors, summarized by the vectorIi. 
According to the logic we have discussed the influences of C j and Ii should not depend 
on each other. Recall that once a recruiter has chosen a location (one’s own residential 
area, or someplace else), she or he is assumed to apply the identical set of (more or less) 
observable individual-level criteria for the final selection. In translating the probability 
model to a corresponding regression equation, we may thus stick to a pure additive 
specification. 
 
Thus, in the light of potential contextual effects on political recruitment efforts we 
conclude that bias may result in either case of recruiter-target relationships. Residing in 
a low-status area may decrease one’s chances of receiving requests to participate 
politically, be it from personal acquaintances or from complete strangers. 
 
As for recruitment bias linked to individual-level properties, the situation is somewhat 
different. Regardless of geographic localization, recruiters are assumed to let detectable 
attributes guide their selection of potential participants when they approach strangers. 
Approaching persons they know, however, there is no reason to believe that visible 
socio-economic characteristics determine the choice of targets.  
 
The proposed expansion of Brady, Schlozman and Verba’s model appears generally 
justifiable.  And, as emphasized, it should be of particular importance in urban settings. 
Drawing attention to the urban social landscape, we know that residential areas tend to 
show variations in socio-economic as well as demographic characteristics. The levels, 
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causes and consequences of housing segregation are all complicated and multifaceted 
topics, but there is no doubt that cities are segregated also in the welfare states of 
Western Europe, albeit to various degrees.8 This is certainly true also for Sweden—the 
country, from which the data we utilize in this study are gathered.9  
 
In the analyses that follow, we explore to what extent recruiters consider neighborhood 
profiles when deciding where to operate. Neighborhoods known as poor or 
‘disadvantaged’ (a label used in Swedish official reports on the segregation issue, and 
frequently also heard in the public debate; cf. Strömblad 2003), let alone dangerous, 
may then be avoided to the benefit of more prosperous and high-status residential areas 
(cf. Cohen and Dawson 1993:297). Thus, the chances of being asked to participate in 
political life may depend not only upon who you are, but also upon where you live.  
3. Measuring Political Recruitment and Contextual Attributes 
To put our theoretical assumptions on trial, we use data from the large-scale Swedish 
Citizenship Survey 2003 (‘Medborgarundersökningen 2003’).10 This survey included a 
battery of questions designed to measure access to political recruitment networks. In 
                                                 
8 The conceptualization of segregation, socioeconomic as well as ethnic, varies considerably 
between European countries reflecting not only demographic diversity, but also differences in 
administrative practices and ideology (cf. Crowley 2001). As a consequence, it is inherently 
difficult to make comparative assessments of its levels, causes and effects. Nonetheless, 
influential scholars seem to agree that European cities are becoming more and more segregated, 
although the levels are still relatively moderate compared to most American cities (cf. Musterd 
2005; Wacquant 1993). 
9 In the Swedish case, it has been shown that both socioeconomic and ethnic segregation 
increased during the economic crisis of the 1990s (Andersson 2000; Bråmå 2003). Moreover, 
Andersson and Bråmå (2004) has demonstrated that the distressed character of poor 
neighborhoods is now being reproduced by processes of selective migration, so called middle-
class leakage, despite large economic interventions from the government in order to prevent 
further deprivation in these areas. 
10 Principal investigators were Karin Borevi, Per Strömblad, and Anders Westholm at the 
Department of Government, Uppsala University. The fieldwork was carried out in 2002 and 
2003 by professional interviewers from Statistics Sweden. The interview method was face-to-
face and the interviews averaged about 75 minutes in length. Funding was supplied by the Bank 
of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and by the Government Commission of Inquiry about the 
Political Integration of Immigrants. The overall response rate was 56.2 percent (2 138 
completed interviews out of a net sample size of 3 804 individuals). It should be noted, 
however, that the sample was divided into two parts: one representative sample of the Swedish 
population and one sample focused exclusively on immigrants and descendants of immigrants. 
The response rate in the representative part of the sample was 64.2 percent producing a total of 
1 261 completed interviews, while the response rate in the other part of the sample was 47.6 
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addition, it also provides rich opportunities to test, and control, relationships of the kind 
we focus on in the present study.  
 
Respondents were asked if they, over the past year, had received any requests, directed 
to them personally, to take part in a total of 19 specified types of political activities.11 
We use this information to construct a dichotomous dependent variable for statistical 
analysis. From an original additive index describing the number of requests each 
respondent had received, we chose to make the essential distinction between those who 
had been approached by a recruiter at least once, and those who were never contacted.  
 
We have chosen this strategy for two reasons. Firstly, we find it most reasonable in 
substantial terms, since the crucial distinction in terms of political networking seems to 
be between those who are ‘in’ (i.e. those who have received at least one request), and 
those who are ‘out’ (i.e. those who did not receive any requests). Secondly, we suspect 
that the additive index may be error-proned, since many requests for the same type of 
activity (e.g. concerning participation in demonstrations) are only counted as one.12
 
                                                                                                                                               
percent producing a total of 877 completed interviews. All analyses in this paper have been 
conducted with proper adjustments for the stratified sampling procedure. 
11 The activities include contacts (with politicians, government officials, organizations, media, 
and judicial bodies); party activities (worked in a political party, participated at a political 
meeting; protests (worn campaign badges, participated in local activity groups, demonstrations, 
strikes, or illegal protest activities; and every day manifestations (donated money, signed 
petitions, boycotted certain products or bought certain products for political reasons. The 
question about requests for participation followed directly after respondents had been asked 
whether during the past year they had carried out any of the listed activities as an attempt ‘to 
bring about improvement or resist deterioration in society’. For each request that the respondent 
had received during the past year, a number of follow-up questions were immediately asked. 
These questions dealt primarily with the relation between the respondent and the recruiter, but it 
was also asked whether the respondent had assented and carried out the requested activity. 
12 Due to the construction of this part of the survey, the value of ‘6’ does not necessarily 
represent a higher frequency than the value of ‘3’, in terms of the (unmeasured) absolute 
number of requests. A respondent may have received numerous requests to participate in 
(different) demonstrations, but no request to become active in other ways. In such a case, the 
registered value in our data will only be ‘1’. It should be noted, however, that we have 
replicated all analyses presented below, using an additive index of requests as the dependent 
variable instead. This index may be regarded as count data and, accounting for ‘overdispersion’ 
in relation to the parameters of the underlying Poisson distribution (e.g. Long 1997:230–238), 
we estimated a negative-binomial regression model. However, these analyses did not yield any 
substantially different results. 
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To perform a systematic investigation on how recruiters are guided by their beliefs 
concerning intra-city differences, we make use of contextual information available in 
our data. All respondents were geo-coded, allowing us to obtain information regarding 
their places of residence.13 By matching the original survey data from official statistics 
on the coded geographical level we have assembled a test-bed that fulfills the 
requirements of contextual analysis (e.g. Books and Prysby 1991: ch. 4). The data set 
contains contextual-level measures, along with the individual-level dependent variable 
(‘have been requested to participate politically, or not’) and proper individual-level 
control variables.14  
 
As indicators, assumed to capture recruiters’ perceptions of different housing areas, we 
use two specific contextual measures: the proportional representation of people who are 
either unemployed or early retired; and the proportional representation of immigrants. 
The first mentioned contextual variable, which we refer to as social exclusion, will 
show high values for housing areas marked by welfare dependency and ‘modern 
poverty’. The proportion of people facing the risk of being avoided by political 
recruiters should be relatively high in such areas. Consequently, their inhabitants —
including those who are gainfully employed—are in general expected to receive fewer 
requests for participation than if they have lived in an area ranking ‘low’ on the social 
exclusion scale.    
 
However, considering the multidimensional character of segregation in Sweden, a 
contextual effect of social exclusion may potentially be due to the over-representation of 
immigrants in poor residential areas rather than to socioeconomic deprivation itself (cf. 
Andersson 2000). Quite in line with earlier remarks, recruiters will have reasons to 
                                                 
13 In the geo-coding procedure, we utilized the so called SAMS (Small Area Market Statistics) 
code. SAMS boundaries—developed by Statistics Sweden, in cooperation with local 
authorities—are drawn to let the resulting districts, for which aggregate data then is obtainable, 
be good approximations of actual residential areas. The standard procedure is to construct fairly 
homogeneous neighborhoods in terms of housing types and tenure form. Sweden  is divided into 
about 9 200 SAMS units, from which 1 524 are included in our data (on average, each included 
SAMS unit is populated by 1.4 Citizen Survey 2003 respondents). 
14 In spite of the apparent hierarchical structure of our data (i.e. individuals are ‘nested’ within 
residential areas) the increasingly popular technique known as multi-level analysis is not really 
an option in this study. Due to the extremely few members of each cluster (more than 70 percent 
of the SAMS areas are ‘represented’ by a single respondent) a multi-level random coefficient 
model is ill suited for the structure of this particular data set. 
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suspect that a randomly selected person in such a neighborhood has a comparatively 
low participatory potential.15 Hence, we also take into account the contextual factor of 
immigrant density in our analyses. 
4. Findings 
Before proceeding with the empirical evaluation of our contextual recruitment model, 
we examine the overall distribution of requests for political participation. As it turns 
out, slightly more than one fourth of the respondents (26.7 percent) has received 
requests at least once (during the past 12 months). In general, then, the access to 
recruitment networks within the Swedish population may be regarded as fairly decent.16 
Distinguishing between request for different kinds of activities17, the data tell us that 
recruiters in most cases have ‘every-day manifestations’ in mind. While some 18 
percent of the respondents reported being asked to perform such activities, the 
corresponding figures for ‘party activities’ and ‘protests’ are considerably lower (3.4 
and 4.8 percent, respectively). A position in between is occupied by request for 
‘contacts’, which about 11 percent of the respondents have received. 
 
Gauging the chances for a randomly chosen recruiter to be successful, the data indicates 
that assents are more common than refusals. A stable majority (56.6 percent) of the 
targets reports that they actually undertook the requested activity.18 On the whole, then, 
political recruitment efforts are quite likely to be transformed into actual political 
activity. As noted earlier, this additional nutrition to democracy is a potential source of 
participatory stratification. Cleavages will be enlarged if the overall sample of targets of 
                                                 
15 As most recruiters probably know, immigrants in Sweden tend to be significantly less active 
in the political life than the autochthonous population (e.g. Bäck and Soininen 1998; Adman and 
Strömblad 2000). 
16 In the USA, however, political recruitment efforts are more common judging from Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady’s data from their Citizen Participation Study (collected in the early 
1990s). The corresponding figure in this data is 52 percent (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995:135).  
17 See footnote 11, for a description of the various forms of political participation that recruiters 
may have in mind. 
18 Comparing different forms of participation, we observe some fluctuation around the general 
figure here too. Yet, differences are quite small, the most notable exception being request for 
party activities to which less than a third (31.6 percent) assented.  
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recruitment efforts mirrors the population categories in which the politically active 
already are over-represented.19
 
In fact, this conclusion is valid also on the aggregate level. Inhabitants of areas marked 
by a high level of social exclusion may, regardless of their own labor-market position, 
tend to experience a sense of powerlessness which will make them less inclined to take 
part in political life.20 In view of this possibility, a negative contextual effect of our 
social exclusion measure on political recruitment efforts would mean that the 
segregation-generated stratification in political participation is further magnified.  
  
In preparing the test-bed for empirical evaluations of urban inequalities, we trimmed the 
data set to include only residents of (larger or smaller) cities. To reduce the risk of error-
proned measures on the contextual level, we furthermore disregarded inhabitants of 
areas too small to be conceived of as housing areas in any meaningful way (to 
accomplish this, we specified that the contextual units should display a minimum 
population of 500 people). Finally, in view of our focus on the significance of labor-
market position on the aggregate level (necessitating that proper controls are performed 
for the corresponding individual-level variable) we also excluded respondents who, due 
to age retirement, no longer belong to the labor-force.21  
 
Turning to estimation issues, our dependent choice variable will only take on the values 
of ‘1’ (or ‘yes’, i.e. the respondent did receive at least one request) and ‘0’ (or ‘no’, the 
respondent did not receive any requests). Hence, a binary regression model should be 
suitable and we employ logistic regression here.  
 
We begin by specifying three versions of the general probability model, utilizing our 
entire sample of urban respondents. The results, presented in Table 1, strongly confirm 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that such a conclusion assumes equal differences in the likelihood of a 
positive response. 
20 Strömblad has presented some evidence for such a causal chain in earlier work (2003: ch. 3). 
However, in that study the similar contextual variable measured only unemployment rates on 
the residential area level.  
21 After these adjustments were made, the data set includes a total of 1 223 observations 
(approximately 60 percent of the original total). It could be mentioned that the descriptive 
statistics on experiences of political recruitment effort reported above proved to be strikingly 
similar in our subset of urban respondents. 
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our theoretically derived expectations. In each of the three models, we find significant 
contextual effects of social exclusion in the hypothesized direction. The data tell us that 
fewer attempts to get people involved in politics are made in residential areas 
characterized by weak labor-force attachment. This effect holds after accounting for the 
corresponding individual-level variable; thus controlling for the unequal neighborhood 
representation of inhabitants who themselves are weakly attached to the labor force 
(being unemployed or early retired). 
 
Table 1. Predicting Recruitment Efforts 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Independent variables        B    SE B      B    SE B     B    SE B 
 
Contextual level             
  Social exclusion  -.103* .025  -.071* .027  -.078*  .029 
  Immigrant density 
 
      -.007  .010 
Individual level           
  Weak labor force attachment  -.763* .327  -.355  .342  -.355  .342 
  Immigrant      -.598* .174  -.644*  .191 
  Male      .452* .167  .451*  .167 
  Age      -.036  .041  -.036  .041 
  Age squared      .000  .000  .000  .000 
  Education      .160* .028  .159*  .027 
  Income      .000  .000  .000  .000 
  (Constant)  .180  .200  -1.532  .902  -1.552  .903 
Pseudo    2 R .03 .08  .08 
N (weighted cases)  1223  1223  1223 
 
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients (B), and standard errors (SE B). The sample is weighted 
to be representative of the Swedish urban population. See appendix for information about the independent 
variables. The reported Pseudo R
2 is  the likelihood-ratio index (also known as McFadden’s Pseudo R
2) 
defined as  , which means that it compares the full model (i.e. with all parameters) to a model 
with just the intercept (Long and Freese 2001:84). Statistical significance: * p < .05. 
0 1 / 1 LL LL −
 
Model 1 represents the most basic version of the contextual model. By gradually 
expanding the list of relevant control variables (in Model 2 and Model 3) we find that 
the original contextual effect decreases in size. Apparently, and quite in line with 
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reasonable expectations, a part of the contextual effect estimated in Model 1 is spurious, 
in that this specification fails to recognize negative selection effects operating in 
segregated urban areas. For example, immigrants are over-represented in neighborhoods 
where social exclusion is high. And people belonging to this category tend to receive 
fewer requests regardless of where they live. Still, we find a significant contextual effect 
of social exclusion also when several potentially confounding variables are accounted 
for.  
 
In model 2 we control for individual-level variations in immigrant status, gender, age, 
income and education.22 Three individual-level variables – immigrant, male, and 
education – show significant effects on political recruitment. Consistent with previous 
research—though in this case also accounting for social-geographic variations—we 
conclude that men more often than women become targets for political recruiters. 
Further, recruiters prefer to approach people who possess more educational resources, 
rather than those with few years of education.23 Finally, in harmony with earlier work 
on the political integration of immigrants in Sweden (Adman and Strömblad 2000) we 
find that residents of foreign origin are significantly less likely to receive requests for 
political participation than residents born in Sweden.  
 
As the result from Model 3 reveals, however, the last mentioned effect is not translated 
to a contextual-level relationship. Here, we let immigrant density enter as a contextual 
control variable along with all individual-level covariates. Interestingly, we may 
conclude that, once controlled for segregation based on social exclusion, ethnic 
segregation have no direct consequences for the neighborhood incidence of political 
recruitment efforts. At the same time, strong evidence suggests that the contextual effect 
of social exclusion is not an artifact of immigrant density. The significant negative 
effect of social exclusion on political recruitment efforts remains after proper controls, 
while the effect of immigrant density is far from being statistically significant.  
 
 
                                                 
22 The reader may consult the appendix for a description of all independent variables, along 
with corresponding univariate statistics. 
23 Interestingly, though, once controlled for the other independent variables, the income level of 
respondents does not seem to influence their access to recruitment networks at all.  
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The social exclusion effect must be regarded as significant also in substantial terms. 
Figure 1 is based on parameter estimates from Model 3 and displays how the predicted 
probability of political requests is related to neighborhood social exclusion. The graph 
depicts two typical individuals. In both cases calculations refer to a male person born in 
Sweden, holding income at its median and the other variables at their mean. In order to 
disentangle the individual and contextual effects of labor force attachment, separate 
calculations have been performed for individuals with strong and weak labor market 
attachment respectively. Evidently, individuals with strong labor market attachment run 
a higher probability of being approached by political recruiters than individuals with 
weak attachment in the same neighborhood. This difference is marginal, however, 
compared to the contextual effect of social exclusion. 
 
As the graph makes clear, the contextual effect of social exclusion is quite substantial. 
Studying within-group tendencies (tracing the lines of the graph from left to right),  we 
note a difference of about 30 percentage units in predicted probabilities of being asked 
to participate. Hence, inhabitants of the least and the most disadvantaged housing areas 
appear to have strikingly different chances of being personally invited to political life. 
 
To sum up our findings so far, the results on the individual level largely confirm 
findings in previous research. Political recruitment serves to mobilize those who already 
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have the potential to make their voices heard, not the marginal and dispossessed. What 
we add to the picture is the importance of contextual characteristics. Rational recruiters 
do not let chance decide where they will go looking for likely targets.  
 
Table 2. Predicting Recruitment Efforts: The Importance of Personal Relations 
  Know recruiter  Do not know recruiter 
Independent variables        B    SE B      B    SE B 
 
Contextual level          
  Social exclusion  -.068* .033  -.069* .032 
  Immigrant density  -.003  .012  .009  .011 
 
Individual level        
  Weak labor force attachment  -.458  .450  -.601  .416 
  Immigrant  -.006  .221  -.644* .227 
  Male  .298  .205  .391* .185 
  Age  -.101* .048  -.030  .044 
  Age squared  .001  .001  .000  .000 
  Education  .083* .027  .124* .037 
  Income  .000  .000  .000  .000 










Pseudo    2 R .04 .06 
N (weighted cases)  1223  1223 
 
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients (B), and standard errors (SE B). The sample is weighted 
to be representative of the Swedish urban population. The reported Pseudo R
2 is  the likelihood-ratio 
index (cf. Note to Table 1). See appendix for information about the independent variables. Statistical 
significance: * p < .05. 
 
Next, we divide our sample according to what we know about the personal relations 
between recruiters and their targets. Table 2 shows the results from two re-estimations 
of the full model after this split-sample procedure. In the first case, we consider only 
recruitment efforts made by someone the respondent knows, while in the second case 
only efforts made by someone the respondent does not know are included in the 
analysis. 
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The reported results empirically confirm our theoretical assumptions. We note that the 
negative effect of area-based social exclusion is statistically significant both when the 
recruiter is known and when she or he is a stranger. Thus, residing in a low-status area 
always reduces one’s chances to receive requests for political activity. In contrast, we 
note that the individual-level variables Immigrant and Male only produce significant 
effects for the cases in which the respondent did not know the recruiter. Being either an 
immigrant or a woman (or both) deflates your expected value, in the calculus of a 
recruiter to whom you are not acquainted. In harmony with theoretical expectations, 
recruiters only use the cues provided by these demographic factors when they seek out 
prospects among strangers. Education is the only individual-level variable that shows 
statistically significant effects in both cases, although one should bear in mind that the 
effect is considerably higher when no personal bond exists between the recruiter and the 
target. The only divergence from initial expectations is that recruiters generally seem to 
put less faith in older persons even if they know them personally.24
 
In view of these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that urban inequality affects the 
process of political recruitment. What matters in the eyes of the political recruiters is not 
merely who you are, or seem to be—but also where you, in fact, live.  
 
This conclusion, we contend, is buttressed by the compatibility between our theoretical 
expectations and empirical findings. In section 2 of the paper we proposed a stylized 
model of how inequalities in recruitment efforts may be due to intra-city selection 
processes. We argued that recruiters are inclined to ‘sample’ potential participants in 
more prosperous residential areas, partly because they tend to form a larger share of the 
population in such areas, and partly because they (wherever they may reside) tend to 
avoid the disadvantageous parts of the city. The analyses performed provide us with 
ample evidence for the latter, externally driven, selection effect. Recruiters indeed seem 
to visit areas with a high degree of social exclusion less frequently, thus reducing the 
chances for all population categories there to be invited to political life. However, to 
fully explain the negative contextual effect of social exclusion also the instances when 
the recruiter is known, we should be able to prove differences also when it comes to 
                                                 
24 It may be noted that since the squared version of the age variable is insignificant we do not 
find any evidence for curve-linear tendencies in this respect. 
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recruiters’ domicile. In fact, this proves to be feasible when utilizing another, similar, 
data source. In comparison to the data analyzed so far, the Citizenship Survey 1997 
(‘Medborgarundersökningen 1997’) included a compatible set of variables. In addition, 
however, the respondents in this survey were also asked if they themselves have 
directed a request somebody else. Although somewhat less recent, we have in this case 
hence data on a sample of actual recruiters.  
 
A series of new analyses based on this source provide evidence consistent also with the 
first part of our explanatory model. Testing the relationship between being a recruiter 
and contextual properties, we find that recruiters less frequently live in areas where 
social exclusion is widespread. Furthermore, controlling for the same set of potential 
confounders as before does not alter this impression. To be sure, recruiters may be 
found among the members of several population categories. But they do not tend to live 
in neighborhoods where large shares of the inhabitants are unemployed or welfare 
recipients. Hence, all else equal, the chances of encountering even a known recruiter in 
such areas are poor.  
5. Concluding remarks 
The results from this study make clear that the process of political recruitment is 
rewardingly analyzed in a contextual framework. Thus, we propose an expansion of the 
Brady, Verba and Schlozman model of rational poltical recruitment efforts. As our 
empirical findings have demonstrated, the chances of being approached by mobilizing 
activists is better – ceteris paribus – for people living in high-status residential areas 
than for those living in areas where social exclusion is wide-spread. We have also 
showed that this result is valid regardless of the personal relation between the recruiter 
and the recruited, although presumably for different reasons. Variations in recruitment 
efforts within personal networks probably depend on the residential patterns of the 
recruiters themselves. When targeting strangers, on the other hand, recruiters seem to be 
influenced by a transmission of beliefs concerning which residential areas it is 
worthwhile to visit. 
 
Taken as a whole, the political recruitment process thus seems to be determined both by 
socio-economic segregation in itself, and by a phenomenon known in the economic 
literature as ‘statistical discrimination’ (cf. Phelps 1972; Sattinger 1998; Arrow 1998). 
21    
Recruiters presumably have no interest in keeping the less advantaged members of 
society away from politics. However, an exclusionary tendency of the kind we see 
between strangers in this study is the collective outcome of their rational prospecting. In 
seeking out what they, for good reasons, believe to be people with a high participatory 
potential they unintentionally extend the cleavages between those who make their 
political voices heard and their silent fellow citizens. 
 
APPENDIX 
Independent variables: coding and descriptive statistics 
 
Social exclusion is the percentage of people who are weakly attached to the labor 
market, i.e. unemployed and people on early retirement pension, in the 
neighborhood. In this study, the level of social exclusion varies from a low of 0.5% 
to a high of 23.0%. The mean value is 8.2% and the median is 7.5%. 
Immigrant density is the percentage of people born abroad in the neighborhood. The 
variation in this variable is considerable and stretches from a low of 1.7% to a high 
of 69.9%. The mean value is 16.7% and the median is 11.7%. 
Weak labor force attachment is coded 1 if the respondent is unemployed or on early 
retirement pension, and 0 if the respondent is gainfully employed or a student. In the 
weighted, restricted sample, 9.5 percent of the respondents are weakly attached to the 
labor force. (The corresponding figure in the unweighted sample is 11.6). 
Immigrant is coded 1 if the respondent is born abroad and 0 if he or she is born in 
Sweden. In the weighted, restricted sample, the percentage of immigrants is 12.2. 
(The corresponding figure in the unweighted sample is 45.5). 
Male is coded 1 if the respondent is a male and 0 if the respondent is a female. There are 
51.4 percent male respondents in the weighted, restricted sample. (The corresponding 
figure in the unweighted sample is 50.6). 
Age is the age of the respondent at the time of the interview. The youngest respondent is 
19 years old and the oldest is 77. Note, however that only ten individuals in the 
restricted sample are 66 years or older. The mean age in the sample is 39.2 years and 
the median is 38 years. 
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Education is operationalized as years of education, including primary school. This 
variable ranges from 0 to 25 years. The mean value is 13.8 years and the median is 
14 years. 
Income is operationalized as family disposable income (SEK 1000). This variable 
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